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The Planning Bureaus 
The planning bureaus are knowledge institutes that provide the Dutch gov-
ernment with knowledge about the present and future state of the country and 
how it is affected by the government’s policies. The name is somewhat mis-
leading, as planning may invoke associations with the faltering centralisation 
policies of the darker days in really existing socialism. These institutes are not 
involved in planning the economy or the provision of services through state-
controlled resource allocation, but in the provision of policy relevant know-
ledge. For these reasons, they prefer to use terms like policy assessment insti-
tutes in their English names, although their Dutch names are anchored in law 
and have become commonplace in Dutch political parlance – and hence I pre-
fer to use planning bureau in English too. 
Currently, there are four planning bureaus in the Netherlands: one provid-
ing advice for economic policy, one providing advice for environmental and 
nature conservation policy, one for social policy, and one for urban and re-
gional planning policy.1 They are government institutes with agency status. 
Each of the institutes answers to a government minister, who caries their po-
litical responsibility and is responsible for their research agenda. The bureaus 
therefore fall under the authority of the executive, but all of them stress their 
status as independent researchers. It is, in fact, through their skilful perfor-
mance of independence that they can provide policy makers with knowledge 
that is considered reliable and neutral to an extraordinary degree. In this chap-
ter, I will show how they manage this remarkable feat. 
Together, the planning bureaus spend about 55 million Euros per year on 
research, resulting in almost three hundred reports per year, as well as numer-
ous occasions of daily advice to policy makers. Reports include policy rele-
vant topics such as: options for public-private cooperation in infrastructure 
(Lijesen/Shestalova 2007), overall short-term economic prognoses (Centraal 
Planbureau 2007), a model for the labour participation of women with child-
                                                                        
1 CPB, Centraal Planbureau, or Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(www.cpb.nl); MNP, Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, or Netherlands Environmental Assess-
ment Agency (www.mnp.nl); RPB, Ruimtelijk Planbureau, or Netherlands Institute for 
Spatial Research (www.rpb.nl); SCP, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, or Social and Cul-
tural Planning Office of the Netherlands (www.scp.nl). 
2 | Willem Halffman 
 
ren (Ooms et al. 2007), or the monitoring of target attainment for environ-
mental policy (Kruitwagen/Koelemeijer 2007). Some of these reports are 
commissioned by a government department, some are produced at the initia-
tive of the institute (in accordance to its general research programme), and 
some are part of their statutory tasks (such as regular economic forecasts that 
are integrated in the budget cycle). Many of the reports present numbers, fre-
quently as the outcome of model calculations, and often the work of the bu-
reaus is presented in the media as calculation (doorrekenen). Some of the bu-
reaus also act as national competent authorities to provide data to internation-
al organisations such as the International Panel on Climate Change or the Eu-
ropean Environment Agency. Apart from reports, the planning bureaus also 
provide incidental policy advice, which can occur through the participation of 
planning bureau directors in top executive meetings, through web-based data 
depositories,2 or even through a simple phone call. The institutes may stress 
their independence, but it is clear that the lines to policy makers are short and 
policy relevance of advice is prominent in their research programme. 
The authority of the planning bureaus is unrivalled in Dutch politics. The 
planning bureaus provide the economic assessments that form the basis of 
public finance projections by the Finance Ministry and hence their assess-
ments feed straight into the government’s budget, ceremoniously presented to 
Parliament in September. The annual assessment of expected changes in in-
come distribution form the basis for annual debates in Parliament over social 
policy and inequality. Key reports of the planning bureaus get prominent me-
dia attention and are in most cases presented as unquestioned assessments of 
the state of affairs. Their economic prognoses are the main input for national 
socio-economic negotiations between employers, unions, and government, as 
well as for the complex negotiations between political parties during the for-
mation of Dutch coalition governments (De Vries 2008, forthcoming). In re-
cent years, some opposition parties have submitted their September counter-
budget to the planning bureaus to increase the credibility of their alternatives. 
Most political parties even submit their election manifestoes to the planning 
bureaus for an assessment of how their programme will perform in economic 
and environmental terms, results that are presented in the media as school re-
port marks clarifying voters’ options (Huitema 2004). 
The position of the planning bureaus and the status of their knowledge is 
not above all doubt or criticism. In the past, political parties have objected to 
the assessment of party programmes, economic assessments have occasionally 
been questioned by competing economists, and both industry and environ-
                                                                        
2 Such as www.milieuennatuurcompendium.nl for regularly updated environmental statistics 
and basic explanations of environmental processes, such as greenhouse gasses, manure, or 
air pollution; usually in the context of current policy goals and goal attainment (produced 
by the environmental planning bureau (the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agen-
cy) in cooperation with Statistics Netherlands and Wageningen University). 
The Dutch Planning Bureaus | 3 
mental organisations have sometimes questioned assumptions of planning bu-
reau assessments (Van den Berg et al. 1993). However, in spite of such epi-
sodes, there are no other knowledge institutes that can compete with the plan-
ning bureaus’ status, while criticism or public objection remains rare. In fact, 
objection against unwelcome findings from the planning bureaus is often pre-
sented in the media as a sign of weakness: Rather than to accept that a policy 
plan does not have a positive outcome, the objecting policy maker is seen to 
escape into technicalities or an attack on the messenger. 
These characteristics make the planning bureaus into a remarkable fea-
ture of the Dutch political landscape. The overall unquestioned acceptance of 
their assessments, and especially their assessment of election manifestoes, is 
met with disbelief in neighbouring countries, where this is seen as an unac-
ceptable form of technocracy (Van den Bogaard 1998). In a time when the 
intellectual discourse about the role of experts in public policy favours a 
modest role for experts, an awareness of multiple expert perspectives, of the 
fallibility of prognoses, or of the negotiated boundary between fact and value 
(Ezrahi 1980; Cambrosio et al. 1992; Barker/Peters 1993; Woodhouse/Nieus-
ma 1997; Van Zwanenberg/Millstone 2001; Hoppe 2005; Jasanoff 2005; 
Maasen/Weingart 2005; Hagendijk/Irwin 2006; Levidow 2007; Felt et al. 
2007), the continued exclusive position of the planning bureaus is puzzling. 
Why do these planning bureaus have such a strong position in Dutch politics 
and policy making? Given that the debate over the role of experts in public 
policy is as lively in the Netherlands as anywhere else (and sometimes even 
involves researchers of the planning bureaus), how is their prominent position 
justified and maintained? 
This chapter will attempt to answer these questions, based on the results 
of extensive research into the role of the planning bureaus by a large group of 
researchers.3 First, I will go into the history of the planning bureaus and pro-
vide a brief overview of their development over time to their current position 
of importance. Second, I will describe the current role and position of each 
planning bureau in more detail, especially since there are important differenc-
es between each of them, which help to illuminate the processes behind their 
                                                                        
3 This includes research under the programme Rethinking Political Judgment and Science-
Based Expertise: Boundary Work at the Science/Politics Nexus of Dutch Knowledge Insti-
tutes, funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO grant 
410.42.16P), under the passionate direction of Rob Hoppe at the University of Twente, in-
volving Peter Scholten, Ragna Zeiss, Udo Pesch, Dave Huitema, and Stans van Egmond, as 
well as several affiliated projects and their researchers, including Susan van ‘t Klooster, 
Annick de Vries, and Willemijn Tuinstra. I will refer to their published work as much as 
possible, but I want to give these researchers credit for both digging up the bulk of the em-
pirical material used here and for discussing these issues at length. Additional research was 
also financed under the NWO programme Planning Nature and Landscape: Under what 
Circumstances Does Expertise Impede or Enhance Collective Policy Making? (grant 
014.11.540). 
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prominence. Third, I will analyse the strength of the planning bureaus and 
identify crucial processes that have built and maintained this strength. Fourth, 
I will try to identify key tensions in the operation of the planning bureaus and 
identify the challenges they face. In the conclusion, I will try to assess the 
pros and cons of the planning bureau model and try to gauge their future, not 
entirely unlike they gauge ours on a daily basis. 
Origins and Expansion 
The Netherlands is not the only country with planning bureaus. Similarly 
named institutes exist in some former French colonies (e.g. Algeria), Cyprus 
(www.planning.gov.cy), or Belgium (the Federal Planning Bureau, providing 
economic policy advice, www.plan.be). Several others, such as the French 
Commissariat Général du Plan, have existed in the past. The roots of such 
organisations reach back to pre-war modernist notions of economic planning 
that involved state intervention on the basis of economic science. Most were 
installed as part of the post-war welfare state institutions and concomitant 
economic state interventionism. However, from the start, there were important 
differences in how planning advice for government was to be shaped and 
where it was to be located (Van den Bogaard 1998). As traditional planning 
notions lost their currency in the last decades of the previous century, plan-
ning bodies looked for new roles, and the Dutch planning bureaus consolidat-
ed their own particular niche in the advisory sector. It is this particular trajec-
tory that I will describe in this section. 
First, we should trace back the origins of the planning bureaus to the dark 
1930s. In several European countries, social democrats advocated some form 
of state intervention to ward off the devastating effects of capitalism’s period-
ic crises. In 1935, the Dutch social democrats presented their Plan of Labour 
(Plan van de Arbeid), advocating Keynesian policies to defeat the crisis and 
rally the nation. One of its writers was econometric pioneer Jan Tinbergen, 
who was to become the first director of the planning bureau for economic pol-
icy advice after the war. A key ingredient of the plan was economic analysis 
that should identify optimum measures for state intervention. The earlier Bel-
gian model for the Plan, presented to the Belgian Labour Party at its 1933 
Christmas conference, went even further. It included nationalisation of major 
industries and an economy that was to be managed by boards of technocrats. 
These proposals reflected the strong belief in technocratic control over an 
economy that had spun out of hand, leading to crisis and fierce labour con-
flicts (Van den Bogaard 1998; Deleeck 2003). 
In the same time frame, a strong steering role for the state was also advo-
cated for urban planning. Here too, (social) scientific research was to form the 
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basis for state intervention. The motto survey before planning of the Scottish 
town planner Patrick Geddes inspired an approach followed in Dutch urban 
plans, such as the Plan for the Expansion of Amsterdam of 1934. Not only 
did the new town planning look to government, but also increasingly to na-
tional government, as the ambitions of spatial planning expanded from town 
to region and, hesitatingly, even to a national scale after the 1930s (Van der 
Cammen/De Klerk 2003: 129–148). Whereas a central steering role for the 
state was much debated in economic policy, it seemed far less questionable in 
Dutch land use and reclamation. To prepare this policy, the government in-
tended to install a National Planning Service (Rijksdienst voor het Plan) to 
assess land needs and draw plans, on the eve of the German invasion. The or-
der installing the Service was eventually signed by the Reichskommissar, Ar-
thur Seyss Inquart, under occupation in 1940. This created the precursor of 
the national planning administration that was to have a central role in Dutch 
spatial planning throughout the twentieth century (Vuijsje 2002).4 
The planning notions of the interbellum were crucial to the negotiations 
between politicians in exile or captivity that formed the basis of post-war re-
construction and the welfare state (e.g. in Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, 
and France). Ideas about economic planning and the role of economists in 
state interventionism developed in diverging directions. In Norway, econo-
metric advice for economic policy institutionalised within the administration, 
whereas in France economists interacted in dialogue with the tripartite consul-
tative planning regime. In The Netherlands, the economic planning advice 
took a very specific form. Starting already in September 1945, a mere four 
months after the liberation, the Central Planning Bureau (Centraal Planbu-
reau, CPB) was installed to advise government on economic policy, which at 
that time included the rationing system for basic consumption goods. Whereas 
the spatial planning service had ended up in the administration, the CPB was 
set up as an independent body, even though it resorted under the administra-
tive responsibility of the ministry. With this somewhat distanced position, the 
CPB started to look for a niche in the ideological conflicts of the day (Van 
den Bogaard 1998). 
Although social democracy had become salonfähig after the war, eco-
nomic planning notions were not accepted across the political spectrum and 
this included contention over the precise role of this planning bureau. By 
about 1950, the CPB had defined its position in this debate by distancing it-
self from the idea that economists were to identify the desired state of the 
economy. One of its core principles remains remarkably similar to this day: 
Tinbergen established that it was up to politicians to specify the preferred pol-
                                                                        
4 Although not proper English, the term spatial planning for regional and urban planning 
has become common in Euro English under influence of stubborn usage by European poli-
cy communities, especially through European Commission documents, at the abhorrence of 
some native speakers. 
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icy outcomes (the welfare function), whereas the econometrists of the CPB 
were to assess which policy measures would help to achieve these goals. For 
example, this could involve a set of connected targets for budget deficits, 
economic growth, or unemployment – as long as these were a coherent set of 
ambitions, as measured by macro-economic analysis. Following Keynesian 
macroeconomics, high levels of employment were seen as an achievable eco-
nomic equilibrium, but at a likely cost of budget deficits and high inflation. 
The CPB therefore presented itself as a source of independent advice by sepa-
rating normative economic goals from politically neutral instrumental advice 
to achieve these goals. This boundary between politics and advice was seen as 
an acceptable alternative to the technocratic planning of Eastern European the 
state-run economies. In order to provide solid advice, CPB’s econometrists 
started to build macro-economic models and predictive indicators, in close 
cooperation with the national statistics agency (Passenier 1994; Van den Bo-
gaard 1998). 
During the fifties and sixties, the CPB and the Spatial Planning Service 
gradually became well-established institutes in their policy domain. However, 
there was no further expansion of the planning bureau model until the early 
seventies. Once again, this was a period with a strong belief in the possibili-
ties of the state to shape society, ideas that were not even confined to the Left. 
Even though, at the time, the social democrats were a major political force, 
the installation of two new Dutch planning agencies occurred under a centre-
right government, before the social democrats entered government in May 
1973. In March 1973, the economic focus of the CPB was complemented 
with a social and cultural planning bureau (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 
SCP). It had a similar mission to assess the »social and cultural welfare« of 
the country: It was to predict future developments in order to assess policy 
options and support policy choice, with equally solid arguments as provided 
for economic policy (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 2003). 
Another expansion developed in a different direction. In 1972, the Scien-
tific Council for Government Policy was formed (Wetenschappelijke Raad 
voor het Regeringsbeleid). The original task envisaged for this Council, was 
to predict longer-term future developments, over-arching the other planning 
bureaus and working for the Prime Minister. However, these futurological 
ambitions were quickly abandoned and the Council developed a profile in 
providing social science-based information for policy and, during the eighties, 
strategic policy explorations. A main reason for the repositioning was the per-
ceived infringement on political prerogatives and a disturbance of the power 
balances in government. Thus the original expectations for the Council to 
predict the future of society and coordinate other planning bureaus, gave way 
to a more reflexive form of policy advice, relying more heavily on problem 
analysis and interpretation, across policy sectors and disciplines. For these 
purposes, the Council consists of university professors appointed for periods 
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of five years, supported by a research staff. In the selection of council mem-
bers, there is some consideration to balance membership between various po-
litical parties. Even though the original intentions can still be found in its or-
ganisational structure, the Council now resembles a think tank more than a 
planning bureau, relying on interpretation more than calculation in the presen-
tation of its expertise (Hirsch Ballin 1979; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid 2001; Scholten 2007, forthcoming). 
Apart from a brief consideration of a planning bureau for health policy 
during the eighties, the third wave of planning bureaus came about only re-
cently. Rather than adding new organisations for scientific policy advice, the 
third wave consisted of a repositioning of existing organisations to follow the 
planning bureau model. In 1996, the National Institute of Public Health and 
the Environment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu) acquired the 
legal function of planning bureau, after having aspired for a status similar to 
the CPB for several years. After 1988, the Department of the Environment 
and the Institute had followed a strategy of relying heavily on »hard« scientif-
ic evidence in an attempt to break into the dominance of economic policy cri-
teria (Hoppe/Peterse 1993). Just as with the establishment of the SCP, the 
creation of a planning bureau for the environment as a countervailing power 
to the CPB fit that strategy. Originally, the new planning bureau was set up as 
an unofficial policy interface of the huge research facility of the Institute 
which comprised thousands of employees and about thirty research laborato-
ries. By 2005, this division had gradually grown more independent of the re-
search facility to form a full-fledged environmental planning bureau (Milieu- 
en Natuurplanbureau, MNP) (Van Tatenhove 1993; Kwa et al. 1994; Rijks-
instituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu 2003; De Vries 2008, forthcom-
ing). 
The last change in the planning bureaus shook up the world of spatial 
planning and lifted the planning bureau function out of the Ministry. In Janu-
ary 2002, the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research was created as an in-
dependent centre of expertise, split from the office of spatial planning in the 
department of spatial planning. The greater distance to policy was seen as the 
crucial ingredient to construct a foothold in the flux of politics, similar to the 
CPB. As the mission statement suggests, the institute aims to »uphold a posi-
tion of authority on the strength of its professional independence« (Ruimtelijk 
Planbureau 2003). Contrary to the other planning bureaus, the spatial plan-
ning bureau has conceived of its role rather differently, stressing design and 
creativity more than the prediction and certification practices that are so cen-
tral to the other planning bureaus (Halffman 2007, forthcoming-a). 
By 2002, the planning bureau model had proliferated to four influential 
institutions in financial and economic policy, environmental policy, social 
policy, and spatial policy. Two processes appear to be important drivers of 
this proliferation. The first is a logic of countering the powerful discourse of 
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calculation and numbers. Both for social policy and environmental policy, 
actors in the executive have sought to install a centre of calculation to provide 
data to counter the force of economic numbers and modelling. The second is 
the gradual naturalisation of the planning bureau concept: The influential po-
sition of previously established planning bureaus has led to the use of the 
planning bureau function as an almost self-evident requirement of policy 
making. The question of how the planning bureau function will be met has 
come to prevail over the question of whether this is a hard-wired functional 
requirement at all. However, to understand the forces behind this proliferation 
in more detail, we need to have a closer look at the variation between the 
planning bureaus. 
Variation and the Force of the Planning Bureaus 
There are significant differences between the planning bureaus in terms of 
organisation, types of expert activity, and positioning in the policy process. 
The size of the planning bureaus is already an indication of different invest-
ment levels (Table 1): The economic and environmental bureaus are much 
larger and the CPB in particular is the most productive in issuing reports. This 
partly reflects the prominence of policy fields, but also the size of the insti-
tutes’ remit. For example, the CPB has statutory tasks in the national budget 
cycle that require the annual production of at least three economic and budge-
tary assessments. The MNP also services policy with several statutory reports, 
in particular with respect to the progress of environmental policy and policy 
goal attainment, including the preparation of reporting towards international 
environmental commitments. In contrast, the statutory reports of the spatial 
planning bureau are very limited, involving monitoring land needs and spatial 
policy. 
The planning bureau function has also been interpreted differently be-
tween the four bureaus, based on different assessments of requirements in the 
policy field they service and on the fact that some have had much more time 
to find a specific niche. Key differences involve how these institutes shape 
their independence and appropriate distance to policy/politics, and the kind of 
expertise they provide to policy makers. 
The CPB, being the oldest and best established of the planning bureaus in 
economic and financial policy, has become the paradigmatic one. It has a 
close relation to policy makers, in particular the civil servants at the depart-
ments of Finance and Economic Affairs, often with shared training in eco-
nomics, econometrics, or accountancy, and career patterns that switch be-
tween the department and the planning bureau. Personal linkages and a shared 
education are complemented with regular contacts during the production of 
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reports, to discuss the main questions to be addressed in a report, exchange of 
data, or the time and format for the presentation of results. In the production 
of assessments for political parties also, the CPB economists base their as-
sessment on clarifications of proposals, typically with parties’ financial spe-
cialists, to make sure proposals form suitable inputs for the computer models 
or are otherwise clear enough to be assessed (Huitema 2004; De Vries 2008, 
forthcoming). 
 
Table 1: Size of planning bureaus in 20065 
 
Staff Full-time 
equivalent 
Budget 
(million €) 
Publications  
in 2006 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 170 N/A 11.0 135 
Social and Cultural  
Planning Bureau (SCP) 
90 76 8.5 50 
Environment and Nature Plan-
ning Bureau (MNP) 
250 205 28.6 80 
Spatial Planning Bureau (RPB) 60 N/A 6.5 25 
Total 570 N/A 54.6 290 
 
In spite of its closeness to policy, the CPB has three key principles to con-
struct a position of independence. First, CPB economists are willing to nego-
tiate which unexpected eventualities should be taken into account (e.g. an un-
predictable change in oil prices), which policy options should be assessed, 
and even to a modest degree how these policy options could be shaped. How-
ever, they are not willing to negotiate outcomes of assessments, even though 
they will answer questions for clarification from their clients. Second, the 
CPB does not question intended policy: if the department indicates that poli-
cies will be implemented or that future targets will be met, then this is not 
questioned by the CPB. In this sense, the economists are loyal to policy and 
do not question the honesty or even political achievability of intended policy 
(partly because this could lead to parliamentary challenges to ministers). 
Third, and especially relevant for its dealings with political parties, the CPB 
tries to be fair, giving competing actors the same chances to discuss or modify 
proposals prior to assessment (De Vries 2008, forthcoming). 
The kind of knowledge that the CPB provides to policy is therefore first 
and foremost of an instrumental6 nature: it provides an answer to questions 
                                                                        
5 (www.cpb.nl, www.rpb.nl, Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau 2007; Sociaal en Cultureel Plan-
bureau 2007; Visitatiecommissie Ruimtelijke Planbureau 2007: 17). 
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that are predominantly formulated by policy makers and this answer is mostly 
presented as the outcome of measurement or calculation. This includes an 
element of policy evaluation, for example in measuring the target achieve-
ment of past policies. Together with the assessment of budgetary realism of 
future policies, this forms an element of a professional pride and mission of 
the CPB economists that involves disciplining politics in terms of budgetary 
realism and soundness of economic policies. 
The environmental planning bureau bares the closest resemblance to its 
economic counterpart. Here too, there is an undertone of a disciplinary mis-
sion, although this mission mostly involves reminding government to its 
commitments in environmental policy. Constant monitoring of target 
achievement, for example in emission reduction, is one of the main objectives 
for the statutory reports the MNP produces periodically. (This difference in 
focus of the statutory report reflects differences between economic/financial 
and environmental/conservation policy, where the Dutch government has re-
lied on precise policy objectives to a much larger extent.) Consequently, the 
MNP is much less inclined to accept intended policy as if its continuation 
were certain: Policy intentions are treated with circumspection, as an easy 
way to polish up future policy target achievement. Another key contrast with 
the CPB is that the MNP has a much more interdisciplinary composition, with 
a more diffracted set of models, principles, and calculative practices. This has 
led the MNP to reflect on cognitive assumptions, the role of uncertainty, or 
the plurality of knowledge practices, more than the CPB (e.g. Rijksinstituut 
voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu/Milieu- en NatuurPlanbureau 2003). The 
diversity of knowledge extends to the department, lacking the shared commu-
nity of practice and episteme of the financial/economic policy world. In sum, 
the MNP similarly provides instrumental knowledge to policy/politics, but 
with more of a stress on evaluation and less close interaction with policy 
makers, putting it in a somewhat more distant – and on occasion conflicting – 
position towards government departments (De Vries 2008, forthcoming). 
The Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) also has a strong profile 
in instrumental forms of expertise, although it tends to stress assessment of 
current conditions in society over projections. Similar to the CPB, it tends to 
assume the assumptions of current policy and provide relevant information 
for its approach. For example, activities in immigrant integration policy has 
tended to follow the dominant policy frame, whereas the more reflective 
Scientific Council for Government Policy has tended to challenge policy as-
sumptions and frames, seen by some as a continued defence of the older mul-
ticultural policy frame (Scholten 2007, forthcoming). Also in line with the 
planning bureau model, the SCP stresses calculation and numbers, although it 
does regularly present these in the context of interpretations of what is going 
                                                                                                                             
6 I am referring here to a typology of expert activities consisting of review, instrumental, 
mediation, advocacy, and reflective activities (Halffman/Bal, forthcoming). 
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on in Dutch society, i.e. interpretative expertise that complements instrumen-
tal expertise. 
Interpretative expertise is dominant in the Spatial Planning Bureau 
(RPB), making it the outlier of the set of four planning bureaus. Since its for-
mation in 2002, the director of the institute has frequently and publicly pre-
sented his view of spatial policy as a decentralised and interactive policy do-
main, in which the national government no longer has a detailed, directive 
role to play. Consequently, he has identified the key niche for the RPB in the 
presentation of novel concepts and visions of spatial planning, presenting new 
and challenging ideas to policy makers. The mission is therefore more to 
present a challenge to policy makers, identify what they could want as policy 
frames and targets, rather than to discipline policy makers into budgetary con-
straints or previously agreed targets. Although the RPB wants to think along 
with policy makers, these choices have actually put it at a greater distance of 
everyday policy making, at least in the perception of civil servants (Halffman 
2007, forthcoming-a). 
In spite of this variation, based on assessed policy needs, there are also 
pressures to conform to the dominant planning bureau model. The model is 
not specified in great detail, yet there seems to be a large degree of policy 
consensus over what the planning bureau function is and over what it should 
provide to policy. One instance where this dominant model becomes more 
concrete is the planning bureau protocol, a set of rules and principles that was 
formulated originally in 1996, as the planning bureau model spread to envi-
ronmental and nature conservation policy. In this document, the directors of 
the planning bureaus7 formulated their position as independent of day-to-day 
policy concerns, based on scientific standards, but also their relevance for 
strategic policy. In addition, the protocol specified that planning bureau re-
ports are public in principle; it specified principles for a politically neutral 
position of employees towards the media; or for the restriction of third-party 
requests for planning bureau advice, giving departments key control over 
their research capacity. The protocol thus tries to define the planning bureau 
function, form a united front between the planning bureaus, and construct and 
maintain a particular type of boundary between experts and policy makers. 
This boundary stresses instrumental policy use, covered by scientific certifi-
cation (for example, through periodic assessments by academic peers) and a 
principle of neutrality and independence. This closing of the ranks helps the 
planning bureaus maintain their particular balancing position in between con-
siderable political interests. 
A second instance where the planning bureau function is articulated and 
maintained, is the periodic evaluation of the planning bureaus – and most 
pronouncedly in the recent evaluation of the spatial planning Bureau. Al-
                                                                        
7 Spatial planning was at that time still represented by the departmental Planning Service. 
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though the academic value of the reports written by the RPB was seen as very 
high, their immediate policy use was considered much more problematic. One 
of the politicians who had helped to bring about the institute as a planning bu-
reau even complained that the RPB increasingly saw itself as a research insti-
tute rather than a planning bureau, a function assigned by law and that there-
fore should not be shrugged (Overdijk 2007; Visitatiecommissie Ruimtelijke 
Planbureau 2007). The straggler was put under considerable pressure to re-
turn to the flock and the dominant planning bureau model, pressure that was 
underlined by the suggestion of top civil servants that perhaps it was time to 
reduce the number of planning bureaus to three (Secretarissen Generaal Over-
leg 2007). The RPB is currently changing its profile to cooperate more close-
ly with civil servants and to provide more instrumental expertise. 
The logic of performance assessment has therefore been mobilised as an 
instrument to discipline these advisory institutes. It has become common 
practice, partly formalised in administrative legislation, that Dutch advisory 
bodies should be reviewed every five years. For the planning bureaus, these 
reviews tend to oscillate between reviews by academic peers, to assess scien-
tific quality, and administrative reviews, to guarantee policy relevance and 
conformity to the planning bureau model. 
At the heart the conformation to the planning bureau function lies a spe-
cific conception of policy making and the role of expertise within that con-
ception of policy making. Policy is seen as the identification of instruments 
and targets, to be negotiated and decided in the political arena, but based on: 
highly black-boxed assessments by the experts of the present state of affairs in 
economy and society; the future state of affairs based on extrapolation of the 
present (with or without intended policies); and the expected future outcome 
of these policies on the state affairs (including prediction of goal achieve-
ment). Planning bureaus are therefore presented as powerful institutes that 
discipline policy makers into rational policy making, defined through realistic 
assessments of future policy outcomes, of budgetary consistency, and of a 
frank confrontation with the results of past policies. 
The Curious Strength of Planning Bureaus 
Why would policy makers let themselves be disciplined by these experts? At 
first, this state of affairs may seem counter-intuitive, as both the executive and 
politicians seem to relinquish power and manoeuvring space to a particular 
set of experts. There are several crucial processes that are at work in the crea-
tion of the relative strength of the planning bureaus. 
First, the planning bureaus have a privileged position in terms of data 
access and accumulated calculative resources. The CPB has negotiated how 
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statistics should be registered with the Dutch statistics agency almost since its 
inception. Many economic statistics are now gathered with an eye on econo-
metric applications that form the core business of the economic planning bu-
reau (Van den Bogaard 1998). Similarly preferred access to data exists for all 
planning bureaus in the case of data managed by the administration, as well as 
knowledge of intended policies, before these intentions become public. As a 
result, it is very difficult (though not always entirely impossible) for other re-
search organisations to compete with the planning bureaus on the same level, 
especially concerning access to information that is covered by administrative 
confidentiality during early policy formation or before policy outcomes are 
reported to Parliament. Planning bureaus tend to make data available through 
their websites for public scrutiny and counter-expertise, but they thereby also 
confirm their role as data clearinghouse. 
In addition to data privileges, the planning bureaus also have accumu-
lated considerable calculative resources, which are very hard to rival. Com-
puter models form an important backbone of economic, environmental, and 
(to a certain extent) the socio-cultural planning bureau. Even the spatial plan-
ning bureau makes use of models, for example to predict future industrial 
land requirements. Some of these models are shared with research partners, in 
academia or consultancy companies, and their architecture is often publicly 
available. (In recent years, it has become common to present the structure of 
these models in specialised reports.) Nevertheless, the operation, mainten-
ance, and constant refinement that surrounds these models makes it hard for 
even informed outsiders to fully participate on an equal level, especially for 
the most complex models that have been developed over several decades. 
In spite of laudable efforts to make data and calculative practices more 
accessible, the planning bureaus have accumulated calculative resources that 
are unrivalled in their respective fields of expertise. At the same time, these 
centres of calculation (Latour 1987) can boast some good results, for example 
with economic projections that are claimed to be more accurate than those of 
the OECD or the Dutch national bank (Kranendonk/Verbruggen 2003). Occa-
sionally, reports of the planning bureaus are questioned, by experts or politi-
cians, because of competing data, theories, assumptions, or differing ratio-
nales; but at the end of the day, their position remains exceptional. 
Second, planning bureaus (although some more that others) successfully 
make use of the rhetoric power of numbers, of being scientific, objective, and 
neutral. The power of numbers is not just a matter of material access to the 
centre of calculation, but apparently also a cultural bias. This becomes partic-
ularly clear in over-stretched precision, when raw projection numbers from 
the planning bureaus are treated as if they were completely precise to the nth 
digit, in spite of considerable uncertainties. To prevent such misuse of data, 
planning bureaus report uncertainty intervals or only rounded figures. How-
ever, numbers get stripped of all circumspection or conditionality in the me-
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dia or political debate, especially the numbers that have the quality label of 
the planning bureaus. This quality label is carefully maintained by avoiding 
the suggestion of political bias as much as possible and by a careful mainten-
ance of scientific quality, for example through academic publishing, com-
bined appointments at universities, or the periodic appraisal by academic 
peers. It is precisely because this scientific reputation is so important, that the 
planning bureaus carefully manage the boundary with policy and politics, re-
fining their specific boundary configuration that combines instrumentality to 
policy makers with neutrality (Gieryn 1999; Halffman 2003). 
Third, the power of (quantitative) assessments that are seen as superior 
and scientific is mobilised not just by the planning bureaus to discipline poli-
cy makers, but first and foremost by policy makers themselves to attempt to 
discipline others. For example, the department of Finance relies on economic 
assessments of the CPB to force other departments into budgetary discipline, 
in the interdepartmental tug-of-war that characterises Dutch policy making. 
For these purposes, the most established planning bureaus have regular meet-
ings with civil servants during the production of reports, to assure that reports 
address topics relevant to policy making. Similarly, political parties challenge 
their competitors to come up with alternative plans or budgets that are as-
sessed equally favourable by the planning bureaus and journalists make com-
parable challenges. In turn, some planning bureaus will occasionally antic-
ipate these manoeuvres by making data available, thereby raising issues for 
debate, but political actors discipline each other with planning bureau assess-
ments as least as much as the bureaus themselves do. 
Fourth, there is a strong overall defence of the role of the planning bu-
reaus in the construction of a shared rationality. Although the planning bureau 
function has become naturalised, their functioning occasionally does get the-
matised and questioned. Civil servants who cooperate with the planning bu-
reaus, but also senior politicians, or the more subtle journalists, are all emi-
nently aware that the knowledge of the planning bureaus is not as absolute as 
the media headlines sometimes suggest, that they may contain paradigm bi-
ases, or be based on questionable assumptions, such as concerning future pol-
icy. Beyond these problems, there is the defence that planning bureaus con-
tain political debate within a reasonable set of best guess assessments. It may 
be possible to question these best guesses, but this is claimed to undermine a 
shared definition of reality, which would make political bargaining or budge-
tary trade-offs much more slippery and uncertain. Just like contracts reduce 
the uncertainty of market exchanges, a shared assessment of next year’s state 
of economic growth reduces the uncertainties in wage negotiations. 
This last argument for the planning bureaus rests on an assessment from 
the perspective of an elder states(wo)man: an interpretation of the overall in-
terest of the political system. The late professor Herman Deleeck, former 
Belgian parliamentarian and authority on the welfare state, formulated this 
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defence of the planning bureau function for Belgium (admittedly in a some-
what different political configuration) in these terms: 
»The possibilities within which [welfare state] negotiations take place, are foremost of a 
macro-economic nature. […]. Statistic data and projections […] form the informational 
basis of these negotiations. This information is provided by, among others, the Planning 
Bureau […]. The consensus must consist of the agreement that the negotiations will not go 
beyond this given frame.« (Deleeck 2003: 227) 
It is remarkable to see that, when questioned in detail, some experienced 
members of the policy elite will show awareness of the considerable uncer-
tainties in planning bureau projections or even in the assessments of current 
affairs. This does not boil down to outright epistemological relativism, but 
rather points to an awareness of the partially conventional nature of this con-
figuration. Senior policy makers often choose to accept planning bureau 
knowledge as best guess assessments, because questioning these would only 
lead to a swamp of policy unpredictability (De Vries 2008, forthcoming). 
This reading finds some support in the self-understanding of the CPB: 
»The unbiased judgements of CPB discourage (politically-motivated) wishful thinking 
about the economy, and confront decision-makers with the trade-offs they should face. 
CPB analyses also greatly limit the time that negotiating parties spend on discussions about 
›the right numbers‹. Disagreement on that score could easily harm mutual trust within a 
typical Dutch coalition Cabinet. Moreover, CPB’s independent position allows it to serve 
as a countervailing power wherever the government is confronted with one-sided economic 
analysis of pressure groups.« (Centraal Planbureau 2003b: 8) 
On the one hand, the argument made here is a functionalist one: The Dutch 
political configuration benefits from a shared definition of the bargaining 
stakes. It is because a particular type of politics, namely bargaining negotia-
tions between socio-economic partners and increasingly also in coalitions, 
works better on the basis of an agreement over the factual state of affairs, that 
the planning bureaus have maintained and expanded their position. However, 
this process is more that a blind mechanism working behind the scenes, as key 
actors will defend this role of the planning bureaus at crucial times, such as at 
the occasion of their evaluation. 
Whether by assessment of policy elites; The naturalisation of the plan-
ning bureau function as a rarely questioned shared belief; the accumulated 
calculative powers of models; the rhetorical power of numbers; the tendency 
of actors to discipline each other into the same logic; or a functional process 
of mutual adjustment, the planning bureaus do seem to have an elective affini-
ty for a particular style of politics. This concerns a configuration in which a 
limited number of institutional actors (political parties, socio-economic repre-
sentatives, government departments) negotiate and bargain, over alternative 
budget allocations or policy measures. This suggests that the planning bureau 
model could be particularly successful in the context of coalition governments 
in proportional representation, corporatism (socio-economic or environmen-
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tal), and strong departmental competition (Halffman/Hoppe 2005). In this ne-
gotiation process, the planning bureaus define the stakes over which these ac-
tors are bargaining. Thus they help stabilise (some critics claim »unduly re-
strict«) a political process through cognitive means, creating a particular 
shared rationality that stresses budgetary restraint, verification of agreements 
through monitoring of policy targets, and the predictability of policy out-
comes. 
Tensions and Challenges 
The position of strength of planning bureaus and their mobilisation for a par-
ticular type of political deliberation is by no means unquestioned. The system 
does raise criticism and also has to face some of the more general problems 
faced by expertise for public policy. 
First, the affinity between planning bureaus and a particular style of polit-
ical deliberation implies that changes in policy style or variation in styles be-
tween sectors (Halffman 2005) have consequences for the position of the 
planning bureaus. The spatial planning bureau is a case in point, where the 
assessment of spatial planning as a deliberative, open, interactive policy field 
led to a different task definition and positioning by its management. In this 
light, the variation in style of operation between the different planning bu-
reaus seems entirely warranted, as this variation can be tailored towards spe-
cific expert niches in differing policy sectors. 
Second, certain shifts in policy style identify new audiences and clients 
for the planning bureaus. Formally, the planning bureaus work for the execu-
tive and fall under the political responsibility of a government minister. How-
ever, planning bureaus can be allowed to work for other clients also. Parlia-
ment has become an increasingly important audience. The spatial planning 
bureau sees Parliament as a place of political deliberation, along with wider 
public debate, where it can contribute to political judgement with novel con-
cepts or strategic visions of land use. The nature and environment planning 
bureau targets some of its periodic reports to Parliament, especially as it aims 
to provide MPs with information on policy target achievement, thus support-
ing the controlling role of the Dutch Parliament. 
Also, planning bureaus have tried to find a way to accommodate contract 
research, for example by making their knowledge available to local govern-
ment or even market parties. Each of the planning bureaus has devised some-
what different rules and practices for how this can be combined with an expli-
cit remit in the national executive. Although client diversion has clear oppor-
tunities for increased resources for these institutes, as well as potentially wid-
er political support, government departments tend to be sceptical of too much 
The Dutch Planning Bureaus | 17 
diversion, as this diverts expert capacity away from their control. Civil ser-
vants tend to see the planning bureaus as their expert resource, that should be 
available to their policy processes, rather than to provide political counter-
parts with ammunition. 
Third, in light of the decreased popularity of the corporatist model of de-
cision making and the alleged unresponsiveness of the Hague towards the ci-
tizenry, planning bureaus are faced with the problem of how to relate to civil 
society and stakeholders. Especially the demands that dissenting worldviews 
should be represented in the knowledge of planning bureaus leads to modifi-
cations in assessment practices. 
Important areas where differing worldviews are now included, are longer-
term foresight exercises. Over the least years, the planning bureaus have coo-
perated in the production of encompassing scenarios that involve radically 
different expectations of the development of Europe as a political entity or the 
further shaping of globalisation (Van 't Klooster 2007). Such efforts are based 
on assumptions about different worldviews, as constructed by researchers in-
volved, rather than direct representation of stakeholders in the framing of re-
search projects. Direct consultation of stakeholders so far occurs when plan-
ning bureaus look for specific data, but there are now some signs that consul-
tation with stakeholders is considered desirable in some cases, for example if 
the framing of uncertainty in environmental assessments (Rijksinstituut voor 
Volksgezondheid en Milieu/Milieu- en NatuurPlanbureau 2003). 
However, stakeholder representation over framing of reports or research 
is a particularly sticky problem for planning bureaus. With such involvement, 
representation is extended from the political arena to the epistemological are-
na, normally so carefully separated in the planning bureau model. Some fear 
that stakeholder involvement could undermine the position of planning bu-
reaus as an objective (or at least neutral) arbiter. The political and epistemo-
logical constitution of planning bureaus revolves around the separation of re-
presentation of facts and of values in two different logics, the former scientif-
ic and the latter political. It is from the maintenance of this separation, how-
ever contorted and artificial (as in the dealings with policy intentions), that 
they derive their main political use. In this context, stakeholder involvement 
is most certainly not impossible, but may require additional guarantees to 
maintain neutrality and avoid capture. 
A fourth tension that has played up in planning bureaus is the issues of 
knowledge pluralism. Especially the economic planning bureau is sometimes 
accused of relying on particular schools of thought in economics, even if 
these are the ones currently dominant in academic economics. This selectivity 
is not just a matter of the knowledge base of the research staff, but it is also 
invested in the design of the computer models that form such an important 
instrument for some of the bureaus. The issue of knowledge pluralism is a 
wider one, returning time and time again in expertise for public policy 
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(Woodhouse/Nieusma 2001). It is occasionally used to argue against planning 
bureau findings. Although these arguments have so far been rather marginal, 
experience with expert issues elsewhere do suggest that they will be raised 
again. 
Fifth, planning bureaus have to face some tensions between the front and 
back office operation. In their public presentation, they position themselves as 
independent, science-based institutes of calculation, outside of the world of 
politics. However, productive development of expertise for policy processes 
requires close interaction between policy makers and experts in the back of-
fice. Hence planning bureaus do not just calculate expected policy outputs 
based in an input of intended policy: This is not a one-directional process, but 
a process that originates in dialogue, where civil servants and researchers 
formulate questions, topics, policy options or potentially relevant uncertain-
ties together. Even though there are complaints that some planning bureaus 
are not sufficiently attuned to policy needs due to lack of interaction with pol-
icy makers, many researchers at the planning bureaus are in regular contact 
with the civil servants who commission their reports. Planning bureaus have 
become increasingly transparent, willing to share details of computer model 
architecture or assumptions at the basis of assessments. The tension between a 
public image of outsiders to politics, but close interaction with policy makers 
has received some answers (e.g. civil servants can influence the topics in a 
report, but not the results of calculation), but will require further attention in 
the future. 
Last, planning bureaus will have to look for ways to relate to competitors 
in the increasingly diverse world of knowledge and expertise. These chal-
lenges force the planning bureaus to rethink their specific added value in the 
complex ecology of Dutch expert advisory institutions (Halffman/Hoppe 
2005). The economic planning bureau has in the past overcome competition 
of both commercial and academic modellers. More recently, it has gained ter-
rain again on commercial consultants, after questions were raised about the 
quality of their work in the assessment of public infrastructure cost and bene-
fits. Its answer has been to look for a role in guaranteeing the quality of 
cost/benefit analysis by developing standards and protocols for consultants 
and public institutes alike (Jong/Geerlings 2003). The spatial planning bureau 
now faces competition in its efforts to interpret the developments in planning 
and identifying strategic future options, including from consultants, real estate 
development corporations, and heterogeneous networks of public-private-
expert cooperation. Also, there are now increasingly important international 
players in the world of expertise for policy, such as the European Environ-
ment Agency, the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (Halffman 
2007, forthcoming-b), or Eurostat. 
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Conclusion: The Future of Planning Bureaus 
Planning bureaus form a particular feature of the Dutch advisory landscape. 
Although they originate in a 1930s planning tradition that is shared with other 
countries, the planning bureaus have developed into a particular way to orga-
nise expert assessment of and for public policy. Represented in public debate 
as a practice of neutral calculation, assessing policy outcomes in a neutral and 
unpartisan way, they create facts and rationales that frame and discipline po-
litical deliberation. 
Although there are deviations from this dominant planning bureau model, 
especially in the current spatial planning bureau, this approach has spread 
from its roots in spatial and economic planning to include environmental and 
socio-cultural expertise. An important process behind the proliferation of this 
model were the efforts to break into the dominance of macro-economic calcu-
lation by countering it with hard numbers, both in socio/cultural policy in the 
1970s and in environmental policy in the 1990s. Through preferential access 
to data and accumulation of calculative resources, the planning bureaus do 
have a considerable advantage over other sources of expertise. In addition, 
policy actors hold each other to the cognitive consensus planning bureaus 
create, either because questioning planning bureau numbers and their scientif-
ic quality label is presented as a rhetorical weakness, or even because of the 
pragmatic position that it is better to accept this consensus than to risk negoti-
ation unpredictability. Meanwhile, talk of the planning bureau function in-
creasingly suggests a naturalisation of the model, as if it is a self-evident re-
quirement of policy making. Formalisation and juridification further embed 
the model and exert pressure on deviations from it, such as through the proto-
col for planning bureaus, administrative evaluation, or legally specified remits 
of advisory institutes. 
The exceptional position of planning bureaus in Dutch policy boils down 
to the accumulation of three key types of resources. First, there are cognitive 
resources, stored in models, data, researchers, networks in academia as well 
as government, leading to unique expertise, unique possibilities to integrate 
policy-relevant knowledge, and at the end of the day also unique predictive 
capacities. Second, there is the accumulation of authority, based on their long 
tradition, their ability to present their knowledge as independent and scientif-
ic, and through the naturalisation of the planning bureau function. Third, the 
planning bureaus have accumulated political resources, through their power-
ful alliance with prominent sections of government (key departments in par-
ticular) and their acceptance as a cognitive stabilisation of political negotia-
tions, be it mutually enforced or voluntarily accepted. As I have shown, this 
accumulation of resources has not proceeded in identical ways for all four of 
the planning bureaus and can be identified most clearly for the CPB. 
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With this configuration, planning bureaus operate especially well in poli-
cy situations where a limited number of institutional actors negotiate, such as 
during the formation of coalitions, budget negotiations between departments, 
or negotiations with socio-economic partners. Although this pattern can be 
clearly identified in the Netherlands, comparison with other countries that 
share some aspects of the planning bureau model could further clarify this re-
lation. Observations from Belgium certainly suggest that similar processes are 
at work there too, even if its Planning Bureau is of much smaller political im-
portance. 
The Dutch planning bureaus may have an exceptional aura of neutrality 
and function as a cognitive arbiter in matters of political deliberation, they do 
favour certain actors in this deliberation. First and foremost, they cooperate 
with the key government departments that oversee their operation and re-
search capacity and negotiate the framing of many of their reports – even if 
some of their work involves the evaluation these departments’ policies. For 
example, politicians leaned heavily on CPB calculations to force social part-
ners into wage restrictions in the early 1980s (Hemerijck 1994), the depart-
ment of the environment relied on the precursor of the environmental plan-
ning bureau to reinvigorate environmental policy in the 1990s, and the de-
partment of Finance now relies on economic projections to enforce budget 
restrictions in its negotiations with other departments. Planning bureaus are 
therefore not just stabilisers, they are stabilisers in the hands of departments. 
Planning bureaus calculate policy outcomes of election manifestoes with ex-
plicit permission from their government departments, helping to structure the 
political debate over public spending or the environment within the limits of 
what is considered rational and realistic. It is not always easy to identify who 
is in charge in this alliance and who disciplines who, the planning bureau or 
the department, leading to typifications of planning bureaus as technocratic 
(experts in charge), bureaucratic (civil servants in charge), or discourse al-
liances (with the shared frame in charge) (Hoppe 2005). Nevertheless, there is 
a clear executive advantage in this configuration. 
The downside to a strong alliance with the executive is its continued in-
sistence on knowledge that is of immediate relevance for its policies, restrict-
ing the space of planning bureaus to be too innovative, too academic, too crit-
ical of policy frames, or too activist about new causes. In other words, the 
dominant planning bureau model favours instrumental expertise over reflec-
tion, mediation, advocacy, or review expertise (Halffman/Bal, forthcoming). 
This is sometimes difficult for the motivation of professionals who work at 
these bureaus. For example, researchers at the environmental planning bureau 
are often motivated by environmental concerns, which sometimes invites at-
tempts to advocate environmental causes, possibly by making under-achieve-
ment of policy visible. This has lead to tensions with the department of the 
environment and is connected to attempts by the MNP to identify Parliament 
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as a secondary client. Researchers at the social and spatial planning bureaus 
(SCP and RPB) value the possibility for creative reflection on the develop-
ments in their policy field with close academic connections. Especially in the 
case of the spatial planning bureau, this has lead to objections about lack of 
policy relevance from the ministry. Remarkably, the sense of mission at the 
CPB often coincides with that of departments, for example with respect to 
maintaining budgetary discipline. 
The future of the planning bureaus depends on how they will deal with 
some of the key tensions identified in this chapter, as well as their changing 
political environment. First, their position depends on a particular style of 
policy making. Although some aspects of this style are deeply embedded in 
Dutch political institutions (such as multi-party coalition governments), cor-
poratist institutions have lost most of their credit. Too close an alliance with 
the executive, facing a more distributed civil society, forces the experts to 
balance between a position as an extension of the bureaucracy or to find some 
way to relate to a diffuse group of stakeholders, increasingly demanding a 
cognitive as well as political voice. Planning bureaus need to remain aware of 
their strategic position towards key clients, involving departments and Par-
liament, but in the future also increasingly civil society stakeholders and even 
supra-national, or regional levels of government. Successful strategic ma-
noeuvring in this complex field may depend on their ability to define the 
planning bureau flexibly, which is likely to generate executive resistance. 
Second, planning bureaus need to face the complex problems of expertise 
in public policy, such as knowledge pluralism, the uncertainties of projec-
tions, the limitations of modelling, or the value assumptions hiding at the bot-
tom of all cognitive endeavours. So far, there has been a reluctance to address 
such issues face-on from sections of the planning bureaus world. This kind of 
reflection on the cognitive core of planning bureaus’ activities is too easily 
seen as undermining of their position as relatively unproblematic cognitive 
arbiters. However, past crises with public expertise, such as the BSE crisis, 
but also the radical questioning of the MNP models’ empirical basis at the 
end of the nineties, shows that such issues will appear sooner or later. In addi-
tion, some of these fundamental cognitive problems have grave consequences 
for the ability of experts to adequately assess risks and opportunities, and may 
well unduly exclude innovative policy suggestions at an early stage. 
Third, planning bureaus will have to deal with growing competition from 
other knowledge providers, commercial, academic, and (semi-)public, nation-
al as well as international, and in some cases even regional (as with spatial 
planning). Planning bureaus can try to stare down this competition by mobi-
lising their extensive cognitive resources, can try to form alliances or supply 
chains, or can try to find specific niches, such as in quality assurance of 
knowledge produced elsewhere. However, here too, their future depends on 
the development of a viable answer to this challenge. 
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On balance, the planning bureau model has some significant advantages 
that are on occasion envied in neighbouring countries. They are influential in 
rationalizing public debate, enforcing budgetary restraint, and the construc-
tion of a particular kind of accountability for policy performance. By doing 
this, they also structure political negotiations by measuring the stakes. As 
such, they seem to be particularly functional to a bargaining style of political 
deliberation. However, observers in neighbouring countries are also shocked 
by the technocratic tendencies in this system and its limited acknowledgement 
of the problematic nature of expertise. These objections are to be taken se-
riously. Even though there have been occasions in Dutch public debate where 
they have been raised, they will continue to challenge the planning bureaus in 
the future. Whether these challenges can be met within the basic planning bu-
reau format, will remain to be seen. 
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